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“The Good of the Country Rises Above Party”: Roosevelt, La Guardia, and 
O’Connor and the Works Progress Administration in New York City During the 
Great Depression 
 
Kristine Avena 
 
On May 6, 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 7034 to create and 
appropriate federal funds for the Works Progress Administration (WPA) during the Great Depression. 
This work relief agency had two major purposes: “to operate a nationwide program of ‘small useful 
projects’ designed to provide employment for needy employable workers and to coordinate the 
activities of the ‘Work Program.’”1 In the struggle to implement this agency, public officials faced severe 
challenges that pushed them to adopt unconventional methods to help their constituencies. Roosevelt 
and the Republican mayor of New York City, Fiorello La Guardia, worked together despite their different 
political party affiliations. These public servants utilized their personal and political relationship to 
institute New Deal programs in New York City. However, New York Congressman John J. O’Connor, a 
member of Roosevelt’s own party, did not participate in this political cooperation. Instead, O’Connor 
obstructed New Deal initiatives, particularly the WPA, and often worked passionately against the 
President and the other New Dealers. With Roosevelt and La Guardia working across party lines and 
government levels, and O’Connor ardently opposed to their efforts, the WPA endured a political seesaw. 
Despite the dominating party polarization over the New Deal during the Great Depression, the alliance 
between Roosevelt and La Guardia against O’Connor over the WPA in New York City was exceptional 
because it demonstrated an instance in which ideology triumphed over party. 
  
Work relief was the federal government’s solution to the economic disaster of the Great Depression. It 
was an effort to provide the unemployed with jobs and help restore their sense of dignity by giving them 
wages. Historians have long argued about the political consequences of work relief within the New 
Deal’s WPA. Richard Polenberg, a noted biographer of President Roosevelt and an expert in political and 
legal history, explained how the politicization of work relief was not a new phenomenon. He shared how 
conservative politicians believed that “there is only one issue in the O’Connor district and that issue is 
the New Deal vs. anti-New Deal.”2 Polenberg’s study emphasized the incendiary conflict between those 
who supported and opposed the New Deal, often to the detriment of those politicians in places where 
the New Deal was popular. Shawn Kantora, Price Fishback, and John Wallis, from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, analyzed how the New Deal solidified Democratic majorities in Congress and 
strengthened the Democratic Party for the next two decades. They argued that “the New Deal did 
contribute to the ascendancy of the Democratic party after the 1930’s.”3 Their research focused on how 
the Democratic Party enjoyed political success and built new political coalitions through their work on 
the New Deal.4  
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This historical study focuses instead on the atypical alliances and unexpected hostilities that emerged 
from the implementation of the WPA. Utilizing primary source material from the Records of the WPA 
from the National Archives, the 73rd to 75th Congressional Records from the Library of Congress, the John 
O’Connor Collection from Chapman University, and the O’Connor Papers from Indiana University, it 
analyzes the higher politics of work relief through the lens of a single federal agency. It demonstrates 
the importance of political relationships in the creation and implementation of the WPA in New York 
City by examining three public officials from different parties and government levels. This study 
highlights two diverse political responses that emerged from the New Deal – one that embraced the 
WPA and one that opposed its purpose. Most importantly, this study emphasizes the significance of a 
rather unknown and overlooked figure in American politics, Congressman John O’Connor. His political 
opposition to the WPA symbolized the passionate resistance that emerged from the conservative 
Democratic faction in Congress during the Great Depression.  
 
Prior to and during the 1930’s, the Democratic and Republican parties were deeply divided on major 
issues facing the nation. The norm was to rally behind the party’s platform and support leaders within 
the party.5 This tradition within politics often led to animosity and resentment between Democrats and 
Republicans. Leon Keyserling, an economic historian of the New Deal, argued that “when the New 
Dealers found to their surprise that no program could unite everybody and that those who in some ways 
had benefited most were turning to bite the hand that fed them, they shifted from the political strategy 
of unity to the political strategy of division.”6 New Dealers were intensely partisan during the Great 
Depression. Rather than uniting the two parties, the New Deal became the scapegoat for further 
contention and discord. Through this massive federal effort, the Republican and Democratic parties 
discovered new means to partake in bitter political fights and separate themselves from each other’s 
policies and actions. New York Governor Al Smith, Roosevelt’s predecessor as governor, remarked in his 
1929 autobiography that the “Republican party, for thirty-five years, in each succeeding presidential 
year has resorted to the false and misleading issue of prosperity,” characterizing Republicans as 
“hypocritical, un-American, and undemocratic.”7 Because of this party polarization, Roosevelt and La 
Guardia’s bipartisan relationship was thus rare and unprecedented.  
 
Major changes in the Democratic Party also exacerbated political partisanship. Ira Katznelson, a political 
scientist and historian, explained how the Depression benefited Democrats tremendously. Before the 
midterm election of 1930, the composition of the House included 218 Republicans and 216 Democrats. 
After the election, the House consisted of 311 Democrats and a mere 117 Republicans.8 Matters only 
got worse in the “partisan transformation of 1932.”9 These massive changes drastically altered the 
manner in which political officials voted and worked with their colleagues. With only a small number of 
Republicans, they were now forced to stay united against their opponents. The significant increase in 
the number of Democratic legislators threatened the interests of Republicans in the House, greatly 
intensifying the divide between the two political parties. Furthermore, after more than a decade of 
Republican Presidents, the Democratic Party yearned for a President of their own. This thirst for 
leadership, along with the socio-economic consequences of the Depression, resulted in a welcoming 
Congress for Roosevelt when he was elected in 1932. The large majority of Democrats in the House 
played a significant role in accelerating the passage of New Deal legislation. During the first session of 
the 73rd Congress, it took merely forty hours of debate to pass eleven key bills in the House – remarkably 
expeditious for a legislative body with the size and composition of Congress.10 Democratic Congressman 
O’Connor, however, was different because he did not conform to this model of party loyalty to 
Roosevelt. 
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The WPA made Roosevelt a national hero when it was formed in 1935. An article in Forum and Century, 
a magazine dedicated to solving the economic calamity that was the Great Depression, was even 
entitled, “They Love Roosevelt.”11 In this article, Richard Neuberger interviewed two citizens and wrote 
that they “both expressed the same sort of faith in the President: a belief in his sincerity and in his 
devotion to the people and no tendency to put on him any blame for mistakes or failures. And both 
referred to him as ‘our President.’”12 Because Roosevelt exuded a sense of trustworthiness and 
integrity, he achieved a personal connection with the American public. This connection allowed the 
people to put faith in their President to enact changes that would help alleviate their dire economic 
conditions. Perhaps one of the most telling statements of Roosevelt’s effect on the American people 
was when Neuberger shared the story of his friend’s mother. His friend explained that “my mother looks 
upon the President as someone so immediately concerned with her problems and difficulties that she 
would not be greatly surprised were he to come to her house some evening and stay to dinner. She 
almost regards him as one of the family.”13 Through his work on the WPA and the New Deal more 
generally, Americans viewed Roosevelt as one of them; as a leader who was directly concerned with 
their well-being and prosperity. He made such an impression on them that they were not hesitant to put 
their trust in his legislation, even if they were not knowledgeable about the specific features of each 
program.  
 
The average American citizenry’s admiration for the President also played a vital role in how Republicans 
and conservative Congressmen portrayed Roosevelt to the press and to their constituents. Neuberger 
wrote that “this is the new strategy of Republicans and conservative Democrats alike. The politicians 
have sensed a tendency among the people to detach Mr. Roosevelt from any objectionable New Deal 
features.”14 Rather than insulting the President, his opponents, including those who were targeted by 
the President to be ousted from the Democratic Party in 1938, often tried to attach themselves to 
Roosevelt’s popular persona in order to score political points. Even during the process of being ousted 
from his party, Governor Martin of Oregon “distinguished between the noble leader and such 
‘incompetent federal officials.’”15 Senator George of Georgia also surprised his state when he described 
Roosevelt as “that great and good man.”16 These examples portrayed the powerful effect of the “New 
Deal standard.”17 This standard held that Roosevelt benefitted from being the main sponsor of the New 
Deal and had the ability to use this standard to help him win another victory for a third term. The 
American public’s faith in Roosevelt and his program showed how effective public opinion was in 
advancing the policymaking process during the 1930’s. Even Roosevelt’s opponents were aware of the 
political ramifications that would come from criticizing the President.  
 
La Guardia, a liberal Republican, deviated from his Republican counterparts in that he enthusiastically 
supported the New Deal and its creator. The personal and political relationship between La Guardia and 
Roosevelt defied the typical partisan rancor between Republicans and Democrats over the New Deal. 
They recognized that through their collaboration on the WPA, they could exhibit their political 
achievements to the American people. La Guardia even admitted that “reputations have been built on 
what the WPA made possible for New York City.”18 The two public servants were cognizant of the status 
they could attain with the successful implementation of this federal agency. It represented a shift from 
past politics in that La Guardia and Roosevelt not only openly flaunted their roles in helping the people 
of New York together, but also exhibited a natural liking for one another. They defied the divisive 
political climate and worked cooperatively in order to advance the WPA in New York City.  
 
There was no question that Roosevelt and La Guardia had a soft spot in their hearts for one another. For 
instance, in a letter from Democratic leader Peter McGuinness to La Guardia, he wrote that “I know the 
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President thinks the world of you. […] He said to me, ‘Peter, he is a great man and my pal.’”19 Roosevelt, 
previously the governor of New York, not only had a special connection to New York City, but also its 
mayor, La Guardia. It was a peculiar sight in the political arena during the 1930’s – the leader of the 
nation and Commander in Chief exhibiting his favorable point of view towards the mere head of New 
York’s City Hall. The disparity between the prestige of their positions made this unseemly couple even 
more noteworthy. The President’s high view of La Guardia was extremely important due to the great 
implications it had for New York City. In fact, Roosevelt even endorsed La Guardia’s reelection and 
declared, “I do not hesitate to express the opinion that Mayor La Guardia and his Administration have 
given to the City the most honest and, I believe, the most efficient municipal government of any within 
my recollection.”20 Roosevelt’s willingness to interfere in this municipal election demonstrated the level 
of trust he had in the Italian mayor and the importance he placed on their political relationship for the 
future of New York. His belief in La Guardia’s “honest and efficient” governance were powerful 
descriptions in emphasizing his confidence in the New York Mayor’s capabilities.21 This odd Democratic-
Republican relationship illustrated the new shift in politics. It demonstrated the willingness of public 
officials to work across party lines and through governmental levels for the betterment of the nation.    
 
Despite their party labels, La Guardia and Roosevelt shared an immense amount of similarities in their 
governance. Perhaps the most noteworthy was their shared vision for New York and the nation. Both 
the president and mayor “sought to leave the physical condition of the nation and the city better than 
they had found it.”22 Through the New Deal, they worked together to ensure New Yorkers and 
Americans alike enjoyed jobs, recreation, culture, arts, and education.23 They fervently believed in 
advancing the welfare of the nation through governmental action. Furthermore, their ultimate aim was 
to promote happiness by using the “power of government.”24 The term “happiness” ran through their 
rhetoric frequently, further emphasizing their similar vision for the people that they served.  
 
Ever since La Guardia’s time in Congress, he had been an avid supporter of the interests of labor unions. 
In contrast to O’Connor’s political clout with Tammany Hall, the Democratic political machine in New 
York City, and private industry, La Guardia’s political influence came from ordinary workers such as 
those from the WPA. One labor supporter even wrote that “no member of Congress has served more 
faithfully, loyally, and devotedly than Congressman La Guardia.”25 This demonstrated the mayor’s 
commitment to labor throughout his career in public service. He sought to eliminate corruption and help 
improve the conditions of workers. La Guardia worked passionately for the benefit of WPA workers by 
demanding increases in WPA jobs and projects, defending the advantages of the program to political 
opposition, and funneling funds from the federal government through his relationship with President 
Roosevelt.26 
 
Through La Guardia’s leadership and support of the implementation of the WPA, the work relief 
program not only flourished in New York City, but also became the blueprint for the nation to follow. La 
Guardia’s progressive initiatives and his desire to maintain a relationship with the President earned him 
a significant advantage in the political climate at the time.27 The mayor’s deliberate decision to sustain 
his connection with Roosevelt proved vital in determining the success of the WPA in New York City. On 
President Roosevelt’s birthday, La Guardia sent a telegram that reported, “you can count on New York 
City doing its part by following your splendid leadership in the great battle being waged against 
depression, poverty, and unhappiness.”28 Referring to initiating the programs of the New Deal, La 
Guardia emphasized his commitment to promote the popular program to the people of New York City. 
He assured the President that he would continue to be a loyal supporter of this federal program to help 
New Yorkers rise out of the draining Depression. Through their cooperation, the mayor and President 
achieved remarkable success for the society, economy, and politics of New York City. 
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However, the WPA faced much political opposition from those who did not believe in its purpose. 
Political enemies, such as Congressman O’Connor and other conservative politicians, believed that the 
program did not cultivate skillful leaders and instead, condoned a government handout of jobs to help 
ease the effects of the Depression. The enemies of the WPA promoted the stereotype of the lazy worker 
who merely participated in useless projects to help the image of the New Deal. Mayor La Guardia, 
however, fought back and reaffirmed how the WPA was necessary in facilitating the recovery of millions 
of people in New York. He argued that “federal work relief had allowed Americans to retain their dignity 
and self-respect.”29 The mayor’s respect for the program stemmed from his ideology that the WPA was 
genuinely the right solution for a city beat down by the Depression. While O’Connor believed that 
private business could solve the dire effects of the Great Depression, La Guardia placed his faith and 
efforts into the WPA. Their political differences demonstrated the various solutions that emerged from 
this decade of economic degradation. Their contrasting solutions to unemployment further represented 
the difficult position that political officials encountered in trying to serve their constituencies and the 
nation as a whole.  
 
Working across party lines and government levels, Roosevelt and La Guardia participated in a symbiotic 
relationship that allowed them to benefit from one another in local and federal politics. Their alliance 
set a new standard for the level of cooperation possible between these two levels of governments. 
Harry Hopkins, the creator of the WPA, declared that “upon your local governments will rest a good 
many responsibilities. The most important of all will be the responsibility for initiating projects of 
acceptable quality and of demonstrable local usefulness.”30 Through their intergovernmental 
partnership, La Guardia and Roosevelt ensured that the WPA would offer jobs to unemployed New 
Yorkers. Despite leading from two different levels of government, they worked efficiently and 
established a new criterion for future local and federal governments.31 As a previous governor of the 
state, Roosevelt had a special interest in New York and effectively utilized his relief agency as a solution 
for recovery.  
 
 
Some observers noted that New York had become “addicted” to federal funding during La Guardia’s 
terms as mayor.32 Compared to the meager amounts in other major cities, such as $70,000,000 in 
Chicago and $24,000,000 in Boston between 1935 and 1937, the WPA expenditure in New York City was 
massive.33 Between August 1, 1935 and August 16, 1937, the WPA spent $409,195,154 on New York City 
alone.34 Furthermore, the WPA’s budget, along with the Public Works Administration, made up of about 
2.3 percent of the nation’s annual GDP.35 This extremely high percentage with respect to the budget of 
the entire country demonstrated the importance that Roosevelt placed on work relief. La Guardia 
continued to solicit the federal government for funds and Roosevelt responded by funneling additional 
funds into the WPA in New York. In a book championing the accomplishments of the WPA, La Guardia 
wrote that “the aid of the Federal Government was solicited and, very frankly, I do not know what we 
should have done without it.”36 La Guardia’s gratitude towards the federal government proved that he 
utilized his amicable relationship with the President to his political advantage. Through this valuable 
partnership, the WPA in New York made “permanent improvements” in education, transportation, 
health, and safety.  
 
The cooperation between La Guardia and Roosevelt demonstrated the importance of intergovernmental 
collaboration. La Guardia even shared that “so long as there is a work relief program supported by the 
Federal Government that program should be wide enough to give employment to all needy 
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employables, leaving to the local Government the care of those who are unable to work.”37 The mayor’s 
belief in the partnership between the two levels of government contributed significantly to the success 
he brought to New York. La Guardia believed that as long as the federal government was on their side, 
New York could accomplish anything. He believed that both the federal and local governments played a 
distinct role in serving the American people.38 The lucrative collaboration between the local government 
of New York City and the national government made way for a new and hopeful era of politics in the 
midst of the Depression-stricken nation.  
 
However, Roosevelt did not offer this financial assistance blindly. He expected La Guardia to openly 
cross party lines to support the New Deal and the mayor did not hesitate to promote its principles. 
Roosevelt needed the WPA to flourish in New York City not only for his own reputation, but for the New 
Deal’s reputation as well. A New York Times article noted that “New York City was doing its part in the 
partnership of which Roosevelt spoke.”39 An advocate against corruption and an enemy of the political 
machine of Tammany Hall, La Guardia was a fervent believer in the government’s duty to support and 
provide for its citizens. With Roosevelt’s help, La Guardia proved that the government could provide 
jobs and inspire hope. Mason Williams, a historian of Democratic politics, wrote that La Guardia set a 
“new standard of municipal government” and transformed the public’s belief in its expectations for the 
government.40  
 
In the middle of the Great Depression, Roosevelt and La Guardia worked together to make New York a 
shining example for the rest of the nation. In one of the President’s letters to La Guardia, he shared his 
hope that other states “would follow New York’s example.”41 By showcasing the success in New York to 
the rest of the nation and Congress, he gained credibility for his New Deal. Roosevelt exalted the 
modern advancements of New York and placed it on a pedestal for the American people to revere. By 
displaying New York’s developments to the American public, Roosevelt hoped to inspire his people to 
follow their example. He also wished to put pressure on Congress to appropriate more funds towards 
New Deal initiatives in light of the great advancements being made in its name. More specifically, 
Roosevelt greatly invested in work relief through the WPA. By working strategically with La Guardia in 
New York City, an urban city that consisted of millions of unemployed Americans, Roosevelt maximized 
the number of Americans, and votes, he could win over and worked diligently to solve the 
unemployment problem. Consequently, the advancements made through the WPA in New York gave 
Roosevelt the momentum he needed for his New Deal agenda and put him in place to win the vote in 
the 1936 presidential election. 
 
La Guardia’s work on the WPA not only gave him a respectable relationship with Roosevelt, but also 
with top officials who worked for the agency. As a result, the WPA made significant strides in New York 
modern life, most notably through the La Guardia Airport. This airport connected New York to other 
states and the rest of the world. La Guardia even boasted in a letter to Roosevelt that “it is the greatest, 
the best, the most up to date, and the most perfect airport in the United States […] It is ‘the’ airport of 
the New World.”42 In an address by WPA Commissioner Colonel Francis C. Harrington in 1939, he 
praised the mayor for the way that he dealt with the unemployment problem in New York City through 
the construction of the La Guardia Airport.  
The problem in New York City was one of particular difficulty because of the 
concentration of population and resulting high land values. That it has been 
satisfactorily solved, as it is by this airport, was due largely to the foresight and energy 
of Mayor La Guardia […] the enterprise could hardly be carried to completion at this 
time had it not been that the WPA was able to join with the City in constructing the 
airport.43  
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La Guardia’s achievements in utilizing the WPA resulted in his national acclaim as a progressive and 
bipartisan leader. While top officials gave La Guardia immense praise for his work on the WPA and went 
out of their way to recognize the New York mayor, O’Connor was not even able to obtain a written 
response from anyone other than lower ranking officials at the WPA. This disparity demonstrated the 
significant role that ideology played in the policymaking decisions of those involved with the WPA. While 
La Guardia publicly supported Roosevelt and the WPA, O’Connor was largely excluded from the inner 
circle of the administration for being an enemy of work relief. 
 
In contrast to La Guardia and Roosevelt’s respectful partnership, Roosevelt and O’Connor, a 
conservative Democrat from New York, had a hostile relationship that epitomized the divisiveness and 
discord of 1930’s politics. Making matters worse, they were two of the most influential players within 
the federal government – actively partaking in back-and-forth altercations, with the New Deal often 
serving as their primary source of disagreement. While Roosevelt held immense power as the head of 
the executive branch, O’Connor was also influential as the chairman of the powerful House Rules 
Committee. O’Connor’s conservatism was detrimental for Roosevelt because of his continual 
obstruction of New Deal legislation. The New Kensington Daily Dispatch accurately illustrated 
O’Connor’s negative impact on President Roosevelt by characterizing him as a “thorn to FDR.”44 
Roosevelt was aware that O’Connor’s chairmanship was vital in determining which New Deal programs 
could withstand the unpredictability of partisan politics.  
 
Prior to O’Connor’s election to Congress in 1923, he was a trial lawyer in New York for 20 years and was 
a member of numerous influential Bar Associations in the state. He attended public school and was an 
alumnus of both Brown University and Harvard University School of Law. In 1915, O’Connor was the 
Secretary and delegate in the New York Constitutional Convention. He was also a member of the New 
York State Assembly from 1920 to 1923.45 Throughout his political career in New York, O’Connor was 
closely associated with Tammany Hall, serving on their legal team and winning significant cases on their 
behalf.46 His impressive educational background and wide range of political experience made him 
extremely qualified to enact changes for the benefit of the American people. He was skilled in the 
practice of law, knowledgeable about the Constitution of New York, and well-connected with the major 
players in the New York Democratic circle.  
 
O’Connor and Roosevelt’s relationship dated long before their careers as a Congressman and President. 
It is interesting to note that O’Connor came from a prominent and politically active family. O’Connor and 
his brothers were well-known in the scope of Democratic politics. Initially, O’Connor and his family were 
fairly supportive of the Roosevelt administration. In 1933, his brother James O’Connor even led the 
campaign for Roosevelt’s nomination in his home state of Maine. The Bangor Daily Commercial dubbed 
James O’Connor as the original “Roosevelt man” for his work on the presidential campaign. These 
positions of power gave Congressman O’Connor and his family a significant amount of political clout in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s. They were not only closely associated with the President, but were part of his 
close circle of advisors and trusted allies. A few years into O’Connor’s political career, when he gained 
more power and influence in Congress, he shifted his stance and turned against the President.  
 
Furthermore, O’Connor’s older brother, Basil O’Connor, was Roosevelt’s law partner and also a member 
of his “Brain Trust,” a group of intellectuals who advised the President on the 1932 presidential election 
and the passage of major legislation.47 Basil also worked closely with the President on establishing a 
polio vaccine. However, when Basil grew cognizant of the political feud between his brother and his 
longtime colleague and friend, he defended his brother’s reputation and hard work. In a letter to 
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President Roosevelt, he wrote, “John has spent 25 years in attaining the position that he now holds in 
public life. […] I cannot and I do not believe that you are against him.”48 This passionate letter conveyed 
Basil’s astonishment and disbelief at the rivalry between the two Democratic politicians. It 
demonstrated how even time and personal connections could not establish an effective détente 
between O’Connor and Roosevelt. In an effort to ease the tension in their relationship, Basil was forced 
to intervene amid the New Deal hysteria. 
 
Prior to Roosevelt’s time in the White House, the nation endured a decade of three “hands-off” 
Republican Presidents, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover. These Presidents would 
not have believed it was the duty of the federal government to provide for the populace during the 
Depression. In particular, Hoover believed that the Depression was a temporary setback that would be 
solved on its own, through the natural actions of ordinary citizens and businesses. As a conservative 
Democrat in Congress, O’Connor did not hide his affinity for these laissez-faire Republican Presidents. 
He exemplified his favorable perspective of President Coolidge while debating House Resolution 372 on 
the floor, a bill that dealt with the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1935. When Congressman 
Woodrum urged action on this bill, O’Connor responded, “I agree with the gentlemen we have a lot of 
things to do. Let me repeat what a great President, one of the greatest Presidents representing another 
party, the late President Coolidge, once said: ‘if you sit tight on them long enough they will always back 
down.’”49 O’Connor was certainly referring here to the New Dealers in Congress. As a conservative 
Democrat, his principles were not in agreement with his progressive colleagues. He utilized this moment 
to verbalize not only his support for previous Republican Presidents over his support for Roosevelt, but 
also his intention to stand by his principles in hopes of diminishing the New Dealers’ momentum. 
 
After Coolidge decided not to run for a second term, Hoover won in the presidential election of 1928 
against Democratic New York Governor Al Smith.50 Hoover’s appeal came from his endorsement of the 
philosophy of “rugged individualism,” in which he stressed the tenacity of the American people and the 
importance of exercising self-reliance in such economic downfalls.51 In a national press release from 
October of 1931, President Hoover promoted his theory of rugged individualism when he patriotically 
declared that “no governmental action, no economic doctrine, no economic plan or project can replace 
that God-imposed responsibility of the individual man and woman to their neighbors.”52 His statements 
coincided with O’Connor’s conservative mindset that the government should not aggressively intervene 
in the daily lives of the American people. Similar to O’Connor’s endorsement of the ability of private 
industry to help the people out of the Depression, Hoover also believed in a non-interventionist 
approach in dealing with the economic and social disaster in the nation. 
 
O’Connor’s support of Hoover’s approach for a limited government impacted his defense of the 
President when Hoover was verbally attacked by a Republican Representative. When impeachment talks 
were rampant in the House after Representative McFadden of Pennsylvania charged Hoover with 
arranging a war debt moratorium in 1931, O’Connor defended the Republican President. He stressed 
that “it’s my President as well as yours he’s talking about, and if none of you are going to defend him I’m 
going to.”53 In defending Hoover, O’Connor publicized his support for the Republican President and 
demonstrated his willingness to cross party lines to defend his principles. Amid the attacks on Hoover, 
O’Connor’s defense of the President resulted in much embarrassment from the Republican Party. 
Republicans were humiliated that a Tammany Democrat was supporting their President against one of 
their own. The New York Times even wrote that “New Yorkers are justly proud of Representative 
O’Connor, who forgot that he was a Democrat in defending the President against a virulent 
Republican.”54 This incident portrayed O’Connor’s highly outspoken character and his ability to defend 
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his beliefs despite their unpopularity. In his interactions with Roosevelt, O’Connor maintained this same 
mindset and acted on his ideological preferences rather than in alignment with his own party. 
 
Furthermore, O’Connor’s affiliation with Tammany Hall played a significant role in his political 
opposition to Roosevelt. Prior to the creation of the New Deal, Roosevelt encountered much conflict 
with the political machine in New York. As the Governor of New York, Roosevelt had worked to oust 
New York City’s Mayor Jimmy Walker from his position due to a personal scandal and charges of 
corruption. Despite Roosevelt’s hesitance to compel Walker to testify in the investigation, he decided to 
do so in an effort to portray himself as an aggressive leader against corruption in light of the 1932 
presidential election.55 However, his opposition to the Tammany-backed Walker came with a political 
cost and resulted in a loss of support from the machine. In 1933, Roosevelt opposed Tammany’s choice 
for Mayor and instead endorsed Fiorello La Guardia and “wanted to be damn sure La Guardia would 
win.”56 Roosevelt’s opposition to Tammany and his support of anti-Tammany politicians not only 
deprived the political machine of patronage, but also stripped them of their control over City Hall and 
the City Council. Tammany’s inability to provide jobs to its supporters undermined the machine’s 
strength and influence in New York City.  
 
O’Connor’s close ties with Tammany and Roosevelt’s actions against the machine contributed to his 
hostility towards Roosevelt. From the beginning of O’Connor’s political career, Tammany Hall was an 
essential component in his political journey from Albany to Washington. Because of Tammany’s 
assistance, O’Connor was loyal to their cause and truly indebted to their support. The head of the 
political machine, Charles Murphy, was fond of O’Connor and even described him as “a useful, 
energetic, dependable and sagacious member of the organization.”57 The Hall was unquestionably 
impressed with O’Connor and contributed to his success throughout his public service, from the New 
York State Assembly and all the way to his terms in Congress. O’Connor’s connection to Tammany 
inevitably became a crucial element of his character and persona. When O’Connor attended a meeting 
with wealthy Republicans in 1938, one observer remarked “doesn’t he look just like a Tammany 
politician – you certainly could never miss him.”58 O’Connor’s loyalty to Tammany thus outweighed his 
loyalty to his own party. Before he was a Democrat, he was a Tammany politician. 
 
Up until the end of O’Connor’s political career, the machine sided with their golden boy. Despite their 
diminishing influence in New York City, the political machine supported O’Connor through Roosevelt’s 
purge and defended him against the actions of the President. The Chicago Tribune reported that 
“Tammany leaders agreed to support Congressman John J. O’Connor, fiery red-headed chairman of the 
powerful House Rules Committee, who led the fight against the reorganization bill, clothing the 
executive branch of the government with dictatorial powers.”59 Tammany fought for O’Connor against 
what they believed were the “dictatorial” actions of the executive branch. Because of O’Connor’s 
opposition to the President and leadership in the fight against Roosevelt’s reorganization bill, Tammany 
still supported the Congressman through political and financial means. O’Connor’s loyal and strong 
relationship with Tammany thus highlighted his adherence to their ideological principles rather than his 
allegiance to the Democratic Party. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the WPA in New York City, Roosevelt and O’Connor had already clashed 
on work relief. When Roosevelt was governor and O’Connor was in Congress, Roosevelt implemented 
his own local unemployment relief program in New York. However, Tammany took advantage of this 
relief program due to their loss of patronage. The machine deliberately acquired the allotted 
unemployment tickets and distributed them through local clubhouses to ensure that votes would go 
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their way. Harry Hopkins noted that “politicians won’t stop at anything to get [the] vote lined up and 
have no regard for WPA or anything except winning elections.”60 Tammany politicized work relief even 
before the New Deal in an effort to strengthen their machine. O’Connor defended their actions in his 
desperation to earn back patronage privileges. In 1937, he shared how “in recent years the chief bane of 
my existence – due to the depression and the schism between New York and Washington – has been the 
job of getting jobs.”61 Despite O’Connor’s strong ideological beliefs, he was still constrained by political 
pressures. He was aware that patronage was essential for the political machine as “no machine could 
long survive without jobs to reward the faithful.”62 
 
Furthermore, when Roosevelt served as the Governor of New York from 1929 to 1932, he only 
collaborated with O’Connor on a limited number of insignificant projects that lacked any real substance. 
This included making the Saratoga Battlefield a National Monument and the federal government 
takeover of the New York State Barge Canal.63 However, Roosevelt still made an effort to maintain an 
open dialogue with O’Connor and establish a personal relationship with him. In a letter to O’Connor in 
1930, Roosevelt thanked him for his work on the Saratoga Battlefield and purposely crossed out the 
form letter’s address of “Congressman” and wrote in “John” instead.64 By using his first name, Roosevelt 
certainly hoped to regard O’Connor as more of a friend than a colleague. It is uncertain, however, 
whether O’Connor viewed the governor in the same respect.  
 
Another instance of Roosevelt trying to establish political relations with O’Connor was by inviting him to 
the State Capitol for a meeting. Referring to an address he gave at a Democratic luncheon in Chicago, 
Roosevelt wrote to O’Connor that “it has occurred to me that some parts of this speech might be of 
interest to you and if you have time I will be glad to hear from you as to whether or not you agree with 
my viewpoint.”65 As governor, and before O’Connor’s opposition to the New Deal, Roosevelt sought to 
hear his perspective on the nation’s current state and wanted to open a productive dialogue between 
the two public officials. Roosevelt’s relationship with O’Connor, however, was nowhere near the extent 
of his personal and political connection with La Guardia. 
 
When O’Connor was elected to Congress in 1923, his immediate membership in the Rules Committee 
was unprecedented. In a statement endorsing O’Connor as the Majority Leader of the House, a 
colleague described the significance and scope of the Congressman’s influence. He described O'Connor 
as “a new man never having been made a member of that Committee. He has been on that most 
important of all committees ever since. Because of his position on that Committee, and his general 
activities in Congress, he has probably been the most active man on the floor from the North.”66 Then, 
O’Connor’s promotion to chairman in 1935 demonstrated the massive amount of power New York 
received at the beginning of the Depression. A Washington Herald article even reported that “New York 
Gets Most Chairmanships of Democrats.”67 From the beginning of his Congressional career, O’Connor 
was already setting new precedents that established the extent of a single Member’s power. This 
foreshadowed the impact he would later have when promoted to the chairmanship of the Rules 
Committee. Because of his outspoken personality on the floor, he was an active Member in the House 
compared to his colleagues. Rather than adopting a passive and mellow approach in the legislative 
process, O’Connor was a man with a fighting nature, always ready to defend the principles he believed 
in and for the people he represented. 
 
O’Connor’s ambitious character was further demonstrated in his decision to run as a candidate for the 
Majority Leader of the House in 1931.68 He expressed his belief that “the leadership should go to a 
Northerner” and that the Democrats should have control over the nation and the House.69 Despite the 
widespread support he received from Tammany Hall, members of the Democratic Party, many other 
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major political players in the New York delegation, and even Southern Representatives, O’Connor 
decided to withdraw his candidacy for the Majority Leader. While alternative political motives were not 
clearly outlined in his announcement of withdrawal, he emphasized his desire to achieve harmony 
within the Democratic Party before the 1932 presidential election. He instead chose to refocus his 
efforts on what would benefit the Democratic Party and explained his goal “at which every true 
Democrat aims – the election of a Democratic President in 1932. To accomplish that result, a united and 
Harmonious Democracy is indispensable.”70 This remark depicted O’Connor’s early ambition to achieve 
a unified Democratic Party. He expressed his desire to work alongside his Democratic colleagues, elect a 
Democratic President, and attain an undivided party to make positive changes for the country. 
Unbeknownst to him, however, he would become the primary player in leading the emergence of the 
conservative faction within the Democratic Party. Despite his early support of President Roosevelt, he 
would eventually oppose the New Deal and actively obstruct its success. 
 
As a Congressman, O’Connor was extremely outspoken and shared his opinion on a wide range of issues 
that Congress faced, from agriculture to banking and all the way to the New Deal. While O’Connor did 
identify with the Democratic Party, he pushed for more conservative agendas that were in line with his 
ideological compass. Much like the formation of the conservative faction within the modern Republican 
Party, the Democratic Party of the 1930’s also faced the conundrum of political coalitions. O’Connor 
differed from his colleagues because he held a considerable amount of power not only in the House of 
Representatives, but also within the Congressional leadership. As chairman of the House Rules 
Committee, he had the authority to grant bills the “rules” that it needed in order to move along the 
legislative process. With this advantage, he had significant influence in Congress to allow bills to 
eventually be signed into law by President Roosevelt. O’Connor also served as the Speaker pro tempore 
for the last 14 days of the 74th Congress.71 With this short but nevertheless powerful post, O’Connor was 
theoretically the third in line to become the President of the United States. His power in Congress 
depicted the political clout he had as a Representative and his ability to be a threatening force within 
the leadership of the federal government. 
 
O’Connor’s perspective of the New Deal was explicitly outlined in the report of “The Accomplishments 
of the First Session of the 74th Congress in Carrying Out the Pledges of the New Deal” in the 
Congressional Record. He shared how “the huge task was not yet completed” and how “several millions 
of our citizens able and willing to work could not find employment in private industry.”72 He outlined his 
viewpoints on the work that still needed to be done – citing initiatives such as improving working 
conditions, agriculture, and housing. Unlike the previous decade of Republican Presidents, O’Connor 
understood that the nation was faced with a drastic economic crisis. To combat its effects, he advocated 
the potential that private industry had to provide jobs for the unemployed. In his report, he did not 
mention work relief and instead, encouraged his colleagues and the American public to lessen the 
impacts of the Depression by embarking upon different avenues.  
 
In O’Connor’s early years in Congress, he was substantially supportive of the interests and rights of 
laborers. O’Connor and La Guardia were even featured together on The Federal Employee’s article in 
1932 entitled, “Members Who Have Been Outstanding in Upholding Cause of Workers.”73 Featured 
alongside other Members of Congress, O’Connor and La Guardia were praised by the magazine for 
working hard for the advantage of laborers across the country. This showed that before the creation and 
implementation of the WPA, O’Connor was not entirely unsympathetic towards the plight of workers. 
He fervently believed in fighting for their rights and securing benefits for them in Congress. However, he 
disagreed with the formation of the WPA and the concept of work relief because of his engrained 
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ideology that it was not the right solution for the nation. He did not believe it went far enough to help 
jobless New Yorkers. He opposed the WPA and advocated private business and industry in hopes of truly 
helping ordinary American workers. 
 
O’Connor’s goals in Congress aligned with his desire to help laborers in the nation. When asked about 
his New Year’s resolution in 1937, O’Connor shared that he was “going to help business along this next 
session of Congress so people could get jobs.”74 While he did express his desire to solve the 
unemployment problem, his deliberate decision to help business rather than work relief was 
contradictory to the mission of the WPA. O’Connor believed that the WPA was blindly giving away jobs 
at a high expense to the federal government and was not cultivating skillful and motivated workers. 
Consequently, he decided to support and grow the business sector in hopes of having the American 
people become reliant on themselves rather than the government. O’Connor believed that business jobs 
were more effective in developing skilled and independent workers. He was more convinced by the 
capabilities of private industry to help curb the effects of the Depression and followed the route that 
conformed most to his beliefs, even if it meant going against the President’s popular program.  
 
A political feud did not exist merely between Roosevelt and O’Connor, but also between La Guardia and 
O’Connor. Their political feud was born long before their disagreements over the New Deal. The two 
public officials were both in Congress from 1923 to 1933 and passionately worked against each other on 
various pieces of legislation throughout the decade. For example, in a House debate in 1932, O’Connor 
and La Guardia had an altercation regarding the delays that occurred within the legislative process in 
Congress. An enraged O’Connor yelled, “it’s ridiculous to spend two days on the proposition as to when 
we should meet and when we should adjourn. We are here now. Let’s stop this monkey business. The 
country won’t stand for this sort of thing.”75 His anger over the delays in the House highlighted not only 
the polarized nature of the political parties in Congress, but also their inability to work cooperatively to 
agree on a simple task, such as the beginning and ending times of a debate.  
 
La Guardia, who was described as the leader of the “allied Progressives” in the House, fought back and 
challenged O’Connor’s authority. At this time, the Democratic Party was not the only party to undergo a 
political transformation. The New Deal also produced a more diverse Republican Party by dividing them 
into progressive, moderate, and conservative coalitions.76 As a progressive Republican, La Guardia 
confronted O’Connor to “use his influence as a powerful member of the Rules Committee to bring out 
some of the important legislation to which he referred.”77 He threatened O’Connor’s leadership within 
the most powerful committee in the House. Their constant disagreements on the floor illustrated the 
hostile nature of their political relationship. Their personal and emotional interactions with one another 
influenced their functions in public service. However, their political discord did not merely begin during 
the passage of the New Deal, or more specifically, the WPA. Instead, the dynamics of their relationship 
were constructed a decade before the popular program. It dealt with engrained principles and 
disrespectful behaviors towards each other – factors that would eventually play important roles in their 
work on the WPA. 
 
A few years later, when O’Connor was still in Congress and La Guardia served as the Mayor of New York, 
the two officials also clashed at a luncheon in New York City in 1937. O’Connor and La Guardia exhibited 
their political and personal hatred for one another over a fight about the keys to City Hall. La Guardia 
bitterly explained, “formerly it was the custom in this city to give the keys of the city to distinguished 
guests. But John O’Connor’s friends were at City Hall so long they didn’t even leave the keys.”78 In La 
Guardia’s statement, he alluded to O’Connor’s affiliation with Tammany Hall. The New York mayor 
evidently criticized O’Connor’s longtime connection with the political boss and the corruption and 
12
Voces Novae, Vol. 8 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol8/iss1/2
“The Good of the Country Rises Above Party” 
 
Copyright © 2016 Kristine Avena  Voces Novae, Vol 8, No 1 (2016)   15 
 
power they held in the city. O’Connor responded by introducing La Guardia as “Mr. Ex-Mayor-shortly-to-
be” and declared that “the Mayor made a nice political speech. But he’s always making them.”79 
O’Connor reacted by taunting the Mayor’s political ambitions and exposing his pretentious behavior. 
This bitter episode displayed their inability to cooperate in political affairs. Rather than treating one 
another with respect, the two public officials decided to partake in an ill-mannered public altercation.  
 
At the luncheon, O’Connor also shared stories of his time in Congress with the mayor. He explained that 
he “sat in Congress with Fiorello for ten years. Every time he took a whack at Tammany I remembered 
an oath I took at my confirmation. That oath was to stand up and defend. And I stood up and 
defended.”80 This portrayed O’Connor’s strident stance against La Guardia’s attacks. He would not 
succumb to political attacks and defended his principles. His “fighter” personality made their political 
feud more complex and incendiary, especially in the case of the New Deal. This altercation highlighted 
the deep animosity between the two public officials. They clearly had no respect or regard for each 
other’s work and did not hesitate to display their hatred to the public. Rather than cooperating to make 
greater advancements in the lives of New Yorkers, they decided to engage in an inflammatory 
interaction to publicize their bitter attitudes towards each other.  
 
O’Connor’s outspoken and fierce character was not only outlined in his relationship with La Guardia, but 
also with other Representatives in Congress. His personality made him extremely menacing to many of 
his colleagues. When debating an appropriation bill for the WPA on the House floor, O’Connor accused 
other Members of Congress of being “only interested in jobs, only interested in the allocation of W.P.A. 
funds which mean jobs.”81 His passionate remarks on the floor emphasized his willingness to fight for 
the principles he believed in. In an effort to defend his unpopular beliefs, he once quoted Marcus 
Aurelius, “Flinch not, neither give up nor despair, if the achieving of every act in accordance with right 
principles is not always successful.”82 This depicted his perseverance in continuing to push for programs 
that he genuinely believed would help combat the effects of the Great Depression. He was forceful in his 
attempts to push for the initiatives he felt were truly beneficial to the American people. But what some 
saw as forceful, others perceived as autocratic and even dictatorial. 
 
As chairman of the Rules Committee, O’Connor utilized his influential position to obstruct New Deal 
initiatives. James Patterson, an American historian, showed how the press and his colleagues viewed 
O’Connor as “one of the most unpopular members of a supposedly popular House” because of his views 
and personality.83 Patterson noted how O’Connor’s obstructionist tactics gave the Rules Committee a 
reputation as the “villain in an otherwise pro-New Deal drama.”84 Despite his lack of popularity with the 
President and the majority of Congress, O’Connor was unmoved and continued to forcefully use his 
committee to the disadvantage of the New Deal. When debating House Resolution 174, an 
appropriations bill for the WPA, O’Connor issued a special rule to prolong its passage within Congress.85 
On the floor, he criticized the President and Democratic Congressmen, impudently declaring that “this 
[bill] has no privileged status in the House […] I, for one, do not intend to match demagogy against 
demagogy.”86 
 
O’Connor’s adherence to his principles was made evident in his support of a rule for  
House Resolution 174, an appropriation bill for work relief in 1935. In his passionate statements, he 
patriotically explained: 
Mr. Speaker, this great House of Representatives can legislate expeditiously and more 
without the fear of any one man […] We legislate in this House by a majority, and that 
majority can always express the will of this House. […] we, as a parliamentary body, are 
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compelled to face that situation, and keep our feet on the floor and not be swept off our 
foundation by any one man or by any minority. […] Mr. Speaker, this rule is a test of not 
yielding to another body, of not yielding to one man or to a small group of men in 
another body. This rule is a test of maintaining our own dignity.87 
Rather than being influenced by the remarks of his colleagues regarding the detrimental effects of this 
rule, O’Connor remained loyal to his principles. Most of the Representatives viewed his actions as an 
obstruction in his hopes to delay the passage of this bill. He refused to yield to his colleagues and 
utilized the short amount of time allotted to him to discuss his unpopular viewpoints.88 O’Connor’s 
remarks demonstrated how he utilized obstructionist tactics to fight for his ideologies. Skillfully 
concealing his true intentions in his statements, O’Connor debated by appealing to the moral sense of 
his colleagues. He assured them that this rule was essential in maintaining the “orderly, respectable, and 
dignified manner” of the House Rules Committee.89 
 
Congressman John O’Connor’s obstructionist strategies against the New Deal were most apparent in his 
passionate opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1937, also known as the Wages and 
Hours Bill. This piece of legislation was significant because it highlighted the beginning of O’Connor’s 
transformation to a position against the interests of laborers. As the Chairman of the Rules Committee, 
O’Connor refused to grant the bill the special rule that was required to be considered by Congress. He 
also constantly refused to directly answer simple questions from his colleagues, such as who was against 
the bill on the committee and why he was acting in an inconsistent manner. On the House floor, he 
repeatedly tried stalling the bill and consequently endured hateful political backlash. In a debate 
regarding the bill, his colleagues vehemently attacked the Chairman, stating he was “just as inconsistent 
as the North Pole is from the South Pole” and questioning his belief of whether or not the Rules 
Committee truly was a “servant of the House.”90 These biting phrases conveyed the disdain and 
resentment his colleagues’ had towards him and his beliefs. In addition to the treatment he received 
from those in Congress, O’Connor also faced massive criticism from the press. The New York Herald 
Tribune reported, “House Rules Group Holds Pay Bill Back” and even described O’Connor’s stalling 
efforts as a “Committee Blockade.”91   
 
O’Connor, however, was strong-willed and passionate in his response to the opposition from Congress. 
On the floor, a weary O’Connor fought back against the criticism and declared that “there should be no 
politics, there should be no geographical lines, there should be no lines drawn anywhere in reference to 
this bill.”92 Despite his attempts to obstruct the labor bill, he faced massive political pressure not only in 
the House, but also from the American public and press. Eventually, the political repercussions began to 
take their toll and O’Connor decided to speed up the passage of the Wages and Hours Bill. The New York 
Journal dubbed him the “Man of the Hour” once he changed courses.93 O’Connor committed the 
infamous political flip-flop. As a result of widespread criticism and the newfound damaged reputation of 
his committee, he decided to appease the pressures building on all sides. This event demonstrated not 
only the complicated political climate during the Great Depression, but also how the needs of the public 
began to change in accordance with the low socio-economic condition of the decade.  
 
Despite the flexibility he exhibited with the FLSA, O’Connor would not be as compromising with the 
WPA. As the chairman of the House Rules Committee, O’Connor moderated numerous debates 
regarding the WPA, particularly to determine the amount of appropriations that the agency would 
receive from Congress. With O’Connor as the chairman, WPA legislation often resulted in unresolved 
outcomes. One particular debate took place in May of 1937 when the House Rules Committee debated 
appropriations for the WPA. Throughout the debate, Chairman O’Connor seemed subdued and 
uninterested in the passionate points being made by his colleagues. After accepting seven major 
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amendments to the resolution, all of which increased the WPA’s appropriation, O’Connor sought to 
reduce the amount of time that the Congressmen could debate their positions. When Congressman 
Burdick of North Dakota gave a telling narrative of the dire condition of his constituents and his inability 
to garner support for his amendments, O’Connor bluntly replied that “the Chair might state that there 
are at least seven amendments pending, and they will not at all be reached within the time allotted 
unless there is some suggestion that debate be reduced to about 2 minutes.”94 Rather than listening to 
Burdick’s concerns and offering a solution to his problems, O’Connor ridiculed his efforts to increase the 
WPA appropriation. The Congressional Record concluded that the “Committee, having had under 
consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 361) making appropriations for relief purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.”95 
 
Congressman O’Connor not only spoke against the implementation of the WPA, but also acted on his 
disapproval of the New Deal agency. He obstructed the passage of various WPA bills and projects and 
also actively worked with opponents of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Some of his efforts include attempting to 
earmark $150,000,000 of relief for highway construction and even seeking to reduce WPA Administrator 
Harry Hopkins’ salary.96 These actions emphasized O’Connor’s lack of respect for the mission and 
purpose of the WPA. His hopes to earmark a WPA project showed his desire to increase government 
accountability for relief projects and make it more difficult for Congress to appropriate funds for the 
WPA. O’Connor abhorred the idea of appropriating such a significant amount of funds for work relief. 
Furthermore, his attempt to decrease Hopkins’ salary emphasized the scope of his opposition to the 
WPA. He would stop at nothing to exemplify his disapproval of the agency, even if it meant interfering 
with the creator’s salary. 
 
O’Connor’s opposition to the implementation of the WPA placed him under much political pressure. He 
was obliterated not only by members of the Republican Party, but especially by those of his own party. 
When debating a WPA bill on the floor, a Congressman by the name of Mr. Stack exposed the dilemma 
O’Connor faced: 
The Honorable John O’Connor is against this bill. Surely to God he can have no hidden 
motive for his vote and his action, because the prudent political thing for him to do 
would be to keep his 100 percent support of President Roosevelt intact. His motive for 
being against this bill, as he has stated here in the House, is not because he is anti-
Roosevelt but because he does not think the bill should be considered and passed, at 
least just now. 97 
Mr. Stack’s admittance that it would be “prudent” for O’Connor to support this bill depicted the tense 
position O’Connor was trapped in. As a member of Roosevelt’s popular party, he was expected to loyally 
and wholeheartedly follow their Democratic leader. Instead, the nation saw progressive Republicans like 
La Guardia going against the norm of politics to side with Roosevelt and support the WPA and 
conservative Democrats like O’Connor disagreeing with the WPA. Unfortunately, O’Connor’s ideological 
principles were not attuned to the politics of the time. He was passionate in his belief of what he 
thought to be right for the country and abided by his ideologies rather than politics. In the case of the 
WPA, O’Connor made the deliberate decision to separate himself from the popular programs of the 
admired President Roosevelt.  
 
Despite his devotion to his principles, Congressman O’Connor still encountered political pressure from 
his constituents in New York’s 16th District. He received a large number of constituent mailings 
regarding the WPA in his district. His constituents ranged from ordinary citizens to union workers to 
private businesses. Each side articulated its interest to their representative, urging him to vote for or 
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against particular bills regarding work relief. The constituent mailings came in various forms, including 
handwritten letters, formal business letters, and even postcards. Mostly, the mailings asked the 
Congressman to support pieces of legislation that ensured the continuation of the WPA. While these 
mailings may have softened O’Connor’s perspective on the WPA, he remained dedicated to his 
principles without publicly opposing the federal agency. Although he faced political pressure from his 
own constituents, O’Connor continued to obstruct New Deal legislation because he believed that federal 
work relief was not an effective solution to the Great Depression.  
 
A major form postcard that O’Connor received in his office occurred at the height of the WPA in 1937. 
Sent by numerous constituents, this postcard urged O’Connor to help increase the WPA expenditure for 
the next year. The postcard read: 
Hundreds of thousands of persons are still dependent on Home Relief in New 
York City.  
Millions are still unemployed throughout the country.  
WPA expenditures in 1936 were $165,000,000 monthly. 
If you vote less than $825,000,000 for the five month period ending June 30th, 
you are voting to dismiss WPA workers, to curtail useful projects, to force America back 
to the “pauperism of the dole.” 
If you vote more than $825,000,000, you are voting to transfer families from the 
Home Relief dole to useful WPA employment.  
We expect and trust that you will defend the economic security of millions of 
WPA workers with as much energy as though your own economic security was at 
stake.98 
This postcard ended with the constituents’ name, signature, and address to prove that they were voters 
in his district. By referring to the consequences of his vote, these postcards aimed to appeal to the 
Congressman’s morality. The postcard highlighted the dire effects of voting for a lesser WPA 
expenditure and the positive outcomes of voting for a higher expenditure. It concluded with an appeal 
to O’Connor’s humanity, urging him to act as if his own “economic security was at stake.”99 The sheer 
number of these postcards proved that his constituents wanted to put immense pressure on him to vote 
to increase the expenditure on which many of their livelihoods depended. As eligible voters, O’Connor’s 
constituents had the power to keep or remove him from office. O’Connor had a major obligation, if he 
wanted to be reelected, to act on their behalf and demonstrate that his views were in solidarity with 
theirs. 
 
However, O’Connor personally did not hold the same views as the majority of voters in his district. 
Despite the disparity between his own views and those of his district, he was forced politically to 
publicly display his support for the WPA. Although O’Connor’s support was not as enthusiastic as Mayor 
La Guardia’s, he still needed to leave the impression that he was working in Congress for the 
advancement of the WPA; his career was at stake. But he was still reluctant. He simply replied to the 
postcards by saying, “I have your letter of January 26th in reference to the appropriation for the Works 
Progress Administration and shall do all I can.”100 This simple and short message was typical of the 
Congressman and his office. He did not specify how he would work in favor of increasing WPA 
appropriations nor address his own viewpoints on the matter. His response lacked any genuine 
articulation of what role he had in the advancement of the WPA.  
 
Minimal responses on work relief were commonplace for the New York Congressman. When mail 
regarding the WPA was sent to O’Connor, his office would release a similar response, stating the date of 
the letter and that he would “do all I can.” On occasion, he would respond differently by stating that he 
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shared the same viewpoint as his constituent. In a postcard regarding the Wages and Hours Bill, a 
constituent asked O’Connor to vote for it “without any further amendments to said Bill.”101 In response, 
O’Connor wrote that “I have your post card of May 18th in reference to the Wage and Hour Bill and I am 
glad to have your views on this measure.”102 However, when a different constituent expressed his 
opposition to the same bill and advised him to vote against the measure, O’Connor gave the same, 
impersonal response. The constituent wrote: 
As a worker, I am writing to urge that you vote against the proposed Wage and Hour 
bill, and use your influence to defeat it. I am convinced that it will deal another terrific 
blow to business which is struggling to get on its feet, and as a result add more millions 
to the unemployed.103 
 
O’Connor’s response to this constituent was contradictory to his principles. It was merely “I have your 
letter of May 19th in reference to the Wage and Hour Bill and I am glad to have your views on this 
measure.”104 While one post card emphasized support of the Wages and Hours Bill, this letter criticized 
the same bill. These inconsistent remarks revealed O’Connor’s attempt to appease all of the viewpoints 
of his constituents to buy himself time. It was also significant that these conflicting responses occurred 
so close to Roosevelt’s attempted purge in the 1938 primary elections. It is likely that O’Connor would 
have responded in this equivocal manner to gain support from his diverse constituency. Rather than 
forcefully expressing his own perspectives to the citizens in his district at this time, O’Connor thought it 
was more prudent to mislead his constituents into believing that he was fighting for their cause. His 
deception and manipulation emphasized his desire to be reelected and maintain his political power.  
 
In addition to clashing with his constituents on work relief, O’Connor had a hostile and unproductive 
political relationship with WPA Administrator Harry Hopkins. Despite O’Connor’s attempts to work with 
Hopkins, the adminstrator was not receptive to the requests that O’Connor made for his district. In 
1936, O’Connor expressed concern to Hopkins about his plan to lay off 42,000 employees on New York 
City projects. O’Connor wrote:  
They have got to be taken care of in some way and we may be only reverting to 
the dole. I am one of those who believe that private industry has not sufficiently 
cooperated and of course until it does the problem remains one for the Government.  
I do wish you would give this New York situation reconsideration because the 
problem there is different from any place else in the country.105  
The Congressman reiterated his concern that this action would hurt the white-collar class in his district. 
He shared that the government needed to step up and help workers when other options were 
exhausted. He ended the letter by eliciting a sense of urgency that the problem in New York City was 
more severe than in other states. Despite being a fervent believer in the capabilities of private industry, 
he admitted that they were not cooperative at the time in diminishing the unemployment problem. This 
episode was another instance in which O’Connor was conflicted between his political ambitions and 
ideology. He was forced to support the WPA out of an obligation to his constituents and their welfare. 
This political pressure compelled him to please his constituents and provide them with immediate relief, 
despite his opposition to the methods of the WPA. 
 
Hopkins had his Assistant Administrator, Lawrence Westbrook, reply to O’Connor’s letter a few days 
later. Westbrook wrote that “I wish to advise that these reductions are now being made in all States 
according to the original plan of the Works Program. […] Throughout this period of severe weather the 
Works Progress Administration employed many more workers than it had originally contemplated, and 
for which funds were available.”106 The letter continued to explain that the funds were “being rapidly 
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exhausted” and that a Congressional action was needed in order to extend employment under the WPA. 
This impersonal response revealed that O’Connor lacked any real political clout or personal connection 
with Hopkins. Instead, Hopkins decided to have his assistant respond to O’Connor and continued to lay 
off the workers despite O’Connor’s plea in his letter.  
 
After months of trying to reach Hopkins by letter correspondence and only receiving responses from his 
aides, O’Connor sent an impassioned letter in July of 1936 to the Associate Director, Roscoe Wright, to 
express his frustration with the department. 
I have never been able to get a reply from Mr. Hopkins to any letters which I 
wrote to him and my situation in New York City, trying to place people to work and on 
relief, or otherwise, is no different from that of every other Democratic member of the 
House. I have practically given up all hope of receiving anything but insults from your 
Works Progress Administration. 
In New York City, where the Administration is controlled by Mayor La Guardia 
and Mr. Moses, no Democrat can see a fourth assistant secretary let alone one of the 
heads.  
Being young, however, and still retaining some patience, I shall just wait.107 
This letter exposed the animosity O’Connor felt towards those who ran the WPA. His disrespectful 
attitude towards the WPA was a result of the WPA’s treatment of him and his requests. He grew 
impatient and was offended with how the agency’s personnel regarded him. His experiences with the 
WPA contributed to his resentment towards its leadership and mission. His disdain, however, did not 
stop with the administration. He blamed La Guardia for his inability to receive a proper response from 
the WPA. O’Connor may have believed that he was being treated differently because of his conservatism 
and wanted to be treated “no different from every other Democratic member.”108 Nevertheless, 
O’Connor did not have a respectable political relationship with WPA officials or the one official who was 
in authority in New York City, La Guardia. His bitter interactions with Hopkins and La Guardia prevented 
him from helping his constituents and making any real progress with the WPA in his district.  
 
Like La Guardia, O’Connor’s stance on the unemployment relief of the WPA was based on his engrained 
ideological principles. While La Guardia fervently believed in the government’s active role in helping the 
people of New York City, O’Connor believed the problem of the Great Depression would be solved by 
private business. He encouraged a solution based on business and skill rather than temporary relief. In a 
nationwide address with the National Radio Forum, O’Connor urged the federal and local governments 
to adopt a more permanent solution to the unemployment problem. He discussed how government 
relief “does not go far enough – that it is only a temporary palliative.”109 While La Guardia truly believed 
the future of the nation would be more prosperous only if the government could effectively intervene 
with unemployment relief, O’Connor believed recovery could best be achieved by encouraging passivity 
on the part of the federal government.  
 
In the address, O’Connor also criticized the WPA for employing unskilled labor rather than trained 
mechanics. While private businesses employed skilled workers in different professions, the government 
was blindly employing unskilled workers merely in an attempt to ease the nation’s anxieties. In 
reference to WPA projects, O’Connor exposed the selfish behavior of some Members of Congress when 
they support a “spending program” simply to take credit for the advancements being made in their 
respective districts. Distinguishing himself from his self-interested colleagues, O’Connor expressed that 
his concern was “not alone for the little district 2 miles long and ½ mile wide [...] I realize the obligation I 
owe as a Representative of not only the 12,000,000 people of the great State of New York, but also the 
120,000,000 people in our country.”110 These statements exemplified O’Connor’s holistic perspective 
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towards the future of the nation. Rather than supporting the WPA for political gains and appraisal, 
O’Connor recognized his obligation was to the American public and not his constituents alone.  
 
O’Connor’s fervent opposition to the WPA stemmed from his commitment to solve the unemployment 
problem not through relief, but through business. In this radio address, he discussed his solution to 
recovery and compared the government expenditure of $1,000,000,000 on public works to private 
enterprise, claiming that “it is only a drop in the bucket compared with what private capital has available 
to spend if properly encouraged.”111 In stark contrast to La Guardia’s progressive government ideology, 
O’Connor believed that the calamity of the Great Depression could only be solved permanently by 
trusting in the benefits of private business. Rather than adopting La Guardia’s aggressive promotion of 
the WPA, O’Connor genuinely believed that the unemployment problem should be left to the private 
sector. He ended his address by admitting that “it may work for the moment – but what are we going to 
do when there are no more rabbits in the hat?”112 
 
O’Connor’s opposition to the New Deal eventually led to the end of his political career. The “purge” of 
1938 exposed a President’s wrath against his resistance and a Mayor’s commitment to the WPA in New 
York City. The “purge,” coined by the press, was Roosevelt’s endeavor to cleanse his party of 
Congressmen who tried to sabotage against him and his New Deal – particularly anti-New Deal, 
conservative Democrats. However, Roosevelt’s antipathy towards conservatism was not a new 
phenomenon. As the governor of New York, he had denounced the conservative mentality that 
advocated for a limited government. In a speech delivered at a Democratic event in 1929, Roosevelt 
criticized conservatives as those “who shut their eyes blindly” and “hold an almost childlike faith” in 
laissez-faire capitalism.113  
 
Through the purge, Roosevelt held onto this same mentality. He sought to realign his party to a more 
liberal platform and diminish the power of the conservative faction that threatened his New Deal. As his 
influence on conservative Democrats weakened, he found himself unable to exercise authority over 
members of his own party. Roosevelt was frustrated with the hypocrisy of Democrats and felt a “special 
animosity” toward those who were willing to run alongside him and then vote against the same pledges 
on which they had been elected.114 The betrayed President thus decided to interfere in Democratic 
elections to secure enough support to pass his legislation. Describing the 1938 election, Adam Lapin of 
the Daily Worker Washington Bureau was conscious of Roosevelt’s strategies and even admitted that “if 
O’Connor is defeated, the chances of getting progressive legislation passed at the next session will be 
considerably improved.”115 Although Roosevelt did not pay much attention to nor exert much effort on 
O’Connor’s reelection particularly, he was ultimately the sole victim in the purge of 1938.  
 
La Guardia, however, played an essential role in ousting O’Connor during Roosevelt’s purge. Not only did 
he cultivate a ripe environment for the purge in Manhattan, but he also used the city’s resources to 
support the Democratic Party’s pro-New Deal candidate, James Fay. When asked by the press if he 
thought O’Connor would be defeated, La Guardia asserted that “there isn’t a question about it.”116 He 
went on to explain how he had worked with O’Connor for a decade in Congress and saw his ineffectual 
governance firsthand. La Guardia’s active role in campaigning against O’Connor revealed his opposition 
to O’Connor’s conservative ideals, his commitment to a broader progressive cause, his desire to weaken 
the political influence of Tammany Hall, and his allegiance to Roosevelt. For the first time, he illustrated 
his support for a “Roosevelt electoral cause” by investing his own political resources to campaign against 
O’Connor. 117 
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The WPA’s opposition to O’Connor was also paramount in guaranteeing his defeat in the primary 
election. O’Connor confided to the press that many WPA workers feared that they would lose their jobs 
if he was reelected.118 Although he emphatically denied this, his need to clarify his position emphasized 
his desperation to obtain the support of WPA workers in his district. But O’Connor failed to appeal to 
such WPA employees because of his reluctance to fight for their cause during his time as their 
Congressman. Even before the implementation of the WPA, O’Connor faced massive political pressure 
from his constituents in New York’s 16th District to alter his stance against a job relief program. Different 
interest groups, including the Social Service Commission, Women’s City Club, Social Science Research 
Council, The Spectator Company, and Catholic Central Verein reached out to O’Connor and asked him to 
support bills that helped the unemployed. They expressed their concern that “widespread 
unemployment has caused much suffering and hardship” and urged him to work to bring “conditions 
back to normal.”119 Despite this pressure, O’Connor’s anti-relief position seemed inflexible throughout 
his terms in Congress. He was even dubbed the “Wages-Bill foe” by a labor newspaper.120 As the 
chairman of the House Rules Committee, he repeatedly delayed the Wages and Hours Bill and impeded 
various WPA bills throughout the legislative process.121 
 
Because of La Guardia and the WPA’s tremendous efforts, O’Connor lost his election. Outraged, he filed 
an affidavit against the WPA and charged them with coercing workers to vote against him, leading to an 
investigation by WPA Administrator Aubrey Williams. While O’Connor was certainly seeking revenge, 
there was some merit to his claims. Methods of coercion did exist in efforts to realign the Democratic 
Party. In O’Connor’s own district in Manhattan, WPA workers were told that “this will be the last check 
you get if O’Connor is renominated.”122 Furthermore, WPA workers in New York organized themselves 
into “shock troops” to campaign from house-to-house against O’Connor.123 The WPA’s active role 
against O’Connor’s campaign illustrated the agency’s opposition to his terms in office.124 WPA officials 
were willing to expend an overwhelming amount of resources to ensure that only New Deal supporters 
would win the ballot. Their opposition to anti-New Deal politicians demonstrated the value they placed 
on having federal officials in Congress fighting for their cause. On the local level, the WPA workers knew 
they had Mayor La Guardia on their side. O’Connor, on the other hand, repeatedly attacked the very 
foundation the WPA was built on. 
 
Despite Roosevelt’s direct intervention in many electoral races on his “hit list,” and his mostly passive 
role in O’Connor’s race, only O’Connor was purged at the conclusion of the 1938 elections. In retaliation, 
O’Connor vehemently declared that the purge was “a violation of the Constitution and grossly un-
American.”125 The feud between these two federal officials revealed the inflammatory nature of their 
relationship. O’Connor was replaced as chairman of the Rules Committee with a New Deal supporter, 
Representative Adolph Sabath from Illinois. No longer chaired by an anti-relief politician, the Rules 
Committee’s new chairman pledged to “fight for the principles of the New Deal.”126 Roosevelt, however, 
was mistaken in believing that he no longer had to engage in quarrels with the Rules Committee and 
members of Congress when he had Sabath on his side. He thought he could pass his New Deal legislation 
more rapidly and smoothly without O’Connor’s sabotage. However, even with O’Connor out of the 
picture, Roosevelt was still unable to pass his valuable legislation for the American people. The new 
chairman was faced with a conservative majority on the committee of five Republicans and five 
Southern Democrats.127 Little did Roosevelt know that the new composition of this Rules Committee 
would “make life difficult for Sabath.”128  
 
A defeated O’Connor scrambled to find another ticket to run on – turning to the Republican Party, the 
Andrew Jackson Party, and even trying to run as an Independent.129 He never regained elected office 
and retreated to a career in law. However, his purge did not silence him. After being purged from the 
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Democratic Party, O’Connor did not cease to demonstrate his hatred towards Roosevelt and the New 
Deal. Filled with vain and anger, he accused the President of making “deals in emotion” and declared 
that Roosevelt would not have a fourth term “if the voters realize in time the full extent of the 
President’s vanities and his willingness to deceive.”130 His purge demonstrated the drastic consequences 
of opposing a popular President and his equally popular programs. While O’Connor fought fiercely for 
his beliefs, he was a hindrance to Roosevelt’s work relief plans for the nation. O’Connor’s deliberate 
decision to oppose the WPA resulted in his public humiliation and the termination of his political career. 
In contrast, La Guardia parlayed his bipartisan support of the WPA into a resounding political success. He 
pushed a progressive agenda in New York City and accepted federal funds wholeheartedly, earning the 
President’s respect and support.  
 
Roosevelt’s purge proved to be politically fatal for his presidential career. Although he removed the 
possibility of obstruction to his New Deal legislation, he immorally intervened in the democratic process 
during the elections of 1938. Headlines read, “Democracy weakens,” “Another Committee Affected,” 
and “Dictatorship Again.”131 His appetite for vengeance did not help him achieve a united Democratic 
Party. Rather than securing support for his New Deal legislation, Roosevelt only divided his party further. 
Roosevelt’s involvement in the purge made the American people question his growing power in the 
executive branch and led to criticism from his colleagues in the federal government.132 Although 
O’Connor’s purge was made possible by the cooperation between the local government in New York 
and the national government, it was a major loss for democracy. Its methods of coercion, intimidation, 
and intervention robbed the citizens of New York of their voice. Roosevelt’s purge took this liberty away 
from the American people and diminished their ability to formulate an opinion for themselves.  
 
The WPA in New York was just one instance of intergovernmental and political party collaboration. The 
New Deal had vast implications in many different areas of the country. Further research could analyze a 
different political response, such as one that includes working across state and city politics, rather than 
through the federal government. By excluding the federal government from the equation, one can fully 
examine the results that emerged solely from local and state governments. More research could also 
illustrate an instance in which political relationships failed in implementing different programs of the 
New Deal. It could investigate how these different political responses contribute to the ongoing 
discussion of the effect of public officials in helping their respective constituencies. Finally, suggestions 
for further studies could include analyzing the difference between the WPA’s implementation in urban 
versus rural areas in the United States. This study could have interesting implications regarding the 
success or failure of its application in different geographical areas. It could also inspire research into the 
many nuances that come with crafting legislation and bipartisan efforts. 
 
The WPA inaugurated a different era of politics – one that allowed a liberal Democratic President and 
liberal Republican mayor from different parties and levels of government to enact widespread changes 
for the American people, while altogether marginalizing a conservative Democratic Congressman. La 
Guardia and Roosevelt were passionate in their support of the WPA, but O’Connor was also passionate 
in his opposition. Ideology rather than party played a major role in the political decisions and 
policymaking of these particular public servants. The argument over work relief in New York City 
demonstrated the emergence of a Democratic conservative faction and the reality of bipartisan 
cooperation during the Great Depression. In a telling declaration at a national press conference in 1938, 
Roosevelt proclaimed that “the good of the country rises above party.”133 
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